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**From the Classics to Cultural History:
Perspectives for Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Research**

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Insurgency and counterinsurgency are phenomena in flux. Doctrines, perceptions, actions and actors are shifting. Accordingly, and also according to the intra-scientific discourses and research questions, methods and theories in the field of insurgency and counterinsurgency studies are also changing. This article discusses some of the recent tendencies and controversies in military history.

In the source language, insurgents are denominated with terms that evoke positive or negative associations as well as connotations implying heroism or cowardice, depending on the point of view of the observer, such as insurgents, rebels, partisans, guerrillas, irregular combatants, franc-tireurs, terrorists, members of the resistance or freedom fighters. In a same vein, counterinsurgency can also be interpreted as crisis intervention, as an operation to install peace or to rid the population of a terrorist regime, as an invasion or occupation or as an undertaking motivated by colonial or imperialist motives. The choice of terms results from normative discourses over the interpretation and linguistically constructed realities. Scientific research tries to free itself from such discourses, but in many regards fails to do so.

The relevant research literature often uses the terms guerrilla warfare or partisan war. Both types of operation are different from classic warfare in two respects: Firstly, they are not – or at least not exclusively – employed by regular troops, and secondly, the tactical, operative or strategic doctrine does not aim at defeating an enemy in the open field, but rather to ambush the enemy troops, to destroy the logistic supply lines, to sabotage the enemy's infrastructure and possibly to collect military intelligence on behalf of a third party; i.e. to wage a small-scale war as opposed to a large-scale war.

The controversial, but in this regard often quoted political theorist Carl Schmitt characterized the *partisan* on the basis of the criteria of irregularity, political commitment, telluric nature and increased mobility.¹ The telluric properties – the fact that the partisan is bound to a particular location – particularly seem to contradict the criterion of increased mobility.²

Adopting the criterion of territorial ties, Boris Barth, for instance, argued that partisan warfare emerged as a side-effect of the early modern-age processes related to the formation of nations and that it later also frequently exerted influence in the context of anti-colonial or secessionist movements.³

As opposed to the above, the criterion of being tied to a specific territory is, according to Barth, not a determining element of “ideologically motivated” guerrillas. Barth describes partisans as irregular troops for the operative support of a third power, while guerrilla warfare is defined as a political and ideological resistance movement. In this view, partisans most frequently appear in conjunction with regular troops. The partisans increase the strength of the regular troops by disrupting the enemy's logistic infrastructure and by pinning down the enemy at the rear with their activities, which results in a weakening of the enemy's strength at the frontline. In addition, local partisans can be used for espionage and smuggling or to secure airborne troops.⁴

The theory that guerrilla can be distinguished from partisans on the basis of the political and ideological attitudes is not accepted by all theorists. Gerhard Schulz, for instance, uses both terms almost synonymously and sees the distinctive criterion in the historical use of the terms only in "partisans" being used for individual fighters, while guerrilla was used more for closed gangs or gang wars. According to him, however, this is a distinction which lost its importance in the 20th century.⁵

The scientific discourse about objective differentiation criteria in the field of irregular warfare was additionally fuelled when Eric Hobsbawm introduced the term and thus the respective character of the social bandit, which he positioned between the profit-oriented, self-centred bandit and the more altruistically motivated freedom fighter.⁶

A contemporary and illustrative example for the adoption of Hobsbawm's thought patterns is Erik C. Landis's study "Bandits and Partisans" about the Antonov uprising during the Russian civil war.⁷ Landis investigates the question, among other things, of how it was possible that peasants were turned into insurgents and bandits into partisans and then later again back into bandits. He grasps the dynamics and contingency of the insurgent movement and shows how a change of strategy and paradigms took place on the part of the counterinsurgent, how the fight against bandits was abandoned and how a brutal regime headed by the two civil war generals Antonov-Ovseyenko and Tukhachevsky, who reacted with internments, hostage-taking and execution of hostages, could be installed.

The scientific field of insurgency was further expanded by James C. Scott, who predominately dealt with the topic of peasants being the foundation of a resistance movement.⁸ Scott noted that peasant uprisings are rather rare, that they occur spontaneously and that they are highly uncertain with regard to their outcome. Scott insists that this does not mean that peasants were unable to engage into opposition and that historians therefore have to keep their eyes open for everyday forms of resistance, for an unspectacular but consistent fight of the peasants against those who exploit them, for measures such as sabotage, deceit, fraud, escape, desertion and civil disobedience. In Scott's opinion, peasants tend to strive for instant profit, rather than for profound and lasting subversions; their actions result from little planning and coordination, and the peasants try to protect themselves by avoiding an open confrontation with those who rule. Consequently, the opposition is possibly not even perceived as such by the ruling elite. It therefore leaves no traces in the documents of the authorities. As a result, the written resources available to historians are rather scant. For an adequate approach to peasant rebellions, Scott recommends acquiring knowledge about the values, language, customs and traditions, value systems and thus about the cognitive attitudes of the rural population and suggests to analyse the "offstage comments and conversations": everyday actions, verses, poems, popular songs, stories, legends, jokes, language and rituals with regard to acts of opposition of the respective group. The more detailed these stories are, the more closely peasants can relate to these stories; and the more these stories and the specific experiences are talked about, the broader the basis for a collective affection while listening to these stories becomes. As a consequence, the basis for collective fantasies and eventually collective actions also increases. According to Scott, passive – and also active – actions of opposition can only be comprehensively grasped by an approach from a perspective of the history of mentality.⁹

It therefore seems that we are in a completely different field than classic military history, which first and foremost deals with strategic questions and analyses issues of recruiting, organisation, battle tactics, the course of a conflict and possibly the commitment and leadership principles of the various parties. In order to coherently investigate the topic

of insurgency and counterinsurgency, however, an expansion of the methodological approach is required. The problem of identifiability is eventually linked to the nature of the insurgents. Insurgents adapt themselves and their fight to the respective environment and develop within this environment. They reveal themselves as insurgents only on specific, short occasions, namely when attacking and while firing at the enemy, only to disappear in the anonymity of the mass shortly afterwards or in the natural environment of their battle sites. Just like they elude the conventional military, they also elude – at least in part – the traditional methods of military history. In this context, Herfried Münkler used the term of the chameleon-like nature of partisans. In order to make partisans more approachable scientifically, he suggested approximating and surrounding the partisan – just like military forces do – rather than trying to define the partisan. The researcher, of course, does not try to destroy the partisan, but rather to describe and understand as many of the partisan's forms.¹⁰ The same applies to insurgency as a whole: the more varied perspectives and methodological paradigms we assume, the more varied, multi-faceted and distinct the image we gain will be.

The large mass of publications not only in the field of military history but also political theory on the topic of insurgency and counterinsurgency use case studies, with the description and analysis of an uprising or the fight against such movements. This often involves an applicatory approach. By looking into past conflicts, new insights that apply to future events should be obtained. Apart from gaining scientific knowledge in a modern historiographical sense, practically applicable knowledge is also searched for. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian stated in the preface to their – highly remarkable – anthology "Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare": "The chapters demonstrate the different ways in which states have failed to adapt to fighting an insurgency, as well as how they succeeded. We hope that this book can serve as a starting point for those looking to understand the principles and history of counterinsurgency, an understanding that is an essential starting point when devising successful counterinsurgency strategies for current and future campaigns".¹¹

Many authors have contributed with their articles on various instances in history to a better understanding of counterinsurgency in operative terms. Similar problems such as ignorance of the local cultural realities, "bad leadership", a lack of coordination between the military and political leadership or a "military culture" which is unable to adapt become evident again and again. In his book "Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750", Ian F.W. Beckett also adopts an applicatory approach which, however, is more strongly based on the theoreticians in the field of insurgency and counterinsurgencies and builds links between such distant occurrences as the American Civil War in the 18th century and the urban terrorism of the present.¹²

In the field of military history and strategic studies, a specific "canon of classic publications" has long been established with regard to the theoreticians in the area of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Some noteworthy classics of insurgency theory include: Carl von Clausewitz¹³, T. E. Lawrence¹⁴, Mao Zedong¹⁵, Vo Nguyen Giap¹⁶, Ernesto Che Guevara¹⁷, Régis Debray¹⁸, Frantz Fanon¹⁹ and Carlos Marighella²⁰; in the field of counterinsurgency, the following publications should not go unnoticed: Charles Edward Callwell²¹, Hubert Lyautey²², David Galula²³, Robert Thompson²⁴, Roger Trinquier²⁵, David Kilcullen²⁶, John Nagl²⁷ and David Howell Petraeus.²⁸

The scientific discourse around these (and other) "classic" publications and the above-mentioned studies which are applicatory in their nature has yielded a nearly countless number of publications and would go far beyond the scope of this paper.²⁹ Interested

readers are recommended to consult the thematic bibliographies of the US Army War College, the Small War Journals, the RAND Corporation and NATO; all of these bibliographies are available online and provide an overview of the most relevant publications.³⁰

The field of insurgency and counterinsurgency corresponds with various present-day research fields, such as new wars, asymmetric wars, total wars, empires, anti-colonial resistance, culture, space, gender, communication, stereotypes, traumatic experience of violence, and should therefore also be approached from various angles.

Issues related to the history of technology were not used as a genuinely military history approach already at an early stage. In early times, research in this area was also characterized primarily by an applicatory nature. For instance, the effects of weapon systems, transportation and communication instruments on the battle actions was investigated. With the establishment of a technology history in the area of cultural studies, topics related to communication and innovation theory were increasingly analysed. In the process, the distinction from media theory increasingly disappeared, which, however, also entailed many new and interesting insights.³¹

Bob Clifford, for instance, analysed media work on the part of insurgents on the basis of the Nigerian Ogoni movement and the Zapatist movement in Mexico. In his work, the marketing strategies of the insurgents are shown on the basis of the technical prerequisites of a worldwide interlinked communication society.³²

Both organisations utilize the possibilities offered by the internet and present themselves as fighters for a purpose with which many can identify: The Ogoni do so by presenting their fight in an ecological context striving for preserving the environment; the Zapatists do so by establishing themselves as fighting at the forefront of an anti-globalisation movement. Clifford claims that even in the age of the internet insurgents are struggling for attention in the media. To achieve their goals, they have to pursue an aggressive marketing strategy. In line with the counterinsurgency strategy of "winning hearts and minds", tactical successes play only a limited role – for both parties. Propaganda measures, creating meaning and medial orchestration are just as important. For historians, topics like the creation of symbolism, remembrance culture, the creation of communities, images of resistance and creating identity gain importance. In his book "The Age of Extremes", Eric Hobsbawm wrote that, for the most part, the history of European opposition movements is a myth.³³ Regardless of whether or not one agrees with Hobsbawm's thesis in its full radical nature, it is evident that the stories of resistance fights as well as the propaganda activities of counterinsurgency contain narrative structures which must be decrypted by historians. Actions against the invaders in Eastern Europe during World War II, for example, were propagated by Soviet historiography as a well-organized, orchestrated, ideological and patriotic partisan fight, although these actions must rather be seen as a diffuse and heterogeneous commitment.³⁴

Harald Potempa shows how military-operative thinking, media coverage and cultural dispositions interact with each other by analysing the perception of small wars in the German military publications. Potempa evaluated the coverage of insurgency phenomena on the basis of the German military weekly journal between 1871 and 1945. He exposes the continuities and shifts with regard to the perception and evaluation of insurgency and further shows which concepts for the German counterinsurgency doctrine as well as some insurgency concepts – like "Werwolf" – resulted from these observations. Concepts which were in a high degree stamped by cultural dispositions.³⁵

Discursive constructions of identities are also one of the major topics of postcolonial studies. Researchers in this field are not only interested in anti-colonial opposition in the course of history but also in the respective historiography. Colonialism is not seen as a mere historical phenomenon: Colonialist ideologies and their remains live on in the cultural memory and the scientific discourse.³⁶

With these problems in mind, but without a normative conception and with the willingness to critically discuss not only the colonial, but also the anti-colonial thinking, Jon Abbink, Mirjam de Bruijn and Klaas Walraven, as editors of an anthology, advocate a change of thought in the historical analysis of the anti-colonial opposition.³⁷

The concept of empire is closely linked to anti-colonial opposition and is presently frequently used as a pattern to explain greater transnational hierarchy structures. A centre-periphery model which assumes the existence of a civilising-political core and peripheral areas that are closer or farther from this core is the decisive basis of this concept. These areas are constructed as the imperial area in which the empire is distinct from "the others", "the barbarians" in terms of culture. In addition to the discourse-related distinction, there is a military protection of the borders, which, however, often fails.

Empires try to exclude their enemies from military innovation, which requires the anti-imperial elements to resort to asymmetric warfare.³⁸ As opposed to symmetric warfare, asymmetric warfare is characterized by the asymmetry with regard to financial, material and technological resources of the parties involved in the conflict. Accordingly, the weaker party utilizes non-conventional methods for fighting, such as partisan war or terrorism, and avoids an open battle. Referring to Mary Kaldor, Herfried Münkler uses the term of "new wars" for such occurrences as a generic term for all types of low-intensity conflicts.³⁹ Insurgents appear in spatial terms as peripheral and tactically as asymmetric warriors.

Dierk Walter embraces this theory, but rejects the concept of "new wars". In his view, colonial wars were with virtually no exception small-scale, asymmetric wars; he states that the European great powers, which propagated, cultivated and in some instances also waged large-scale symmetric war, never ceased being involved in asymmetric small wars to protect their interests at the colonial or imperial periphery. If one were to investigate the overall number of armed conflicts regardless of the chronological or regional distribution, it would become evident that asymmetric wars were not the exception, but the rule.⁴⁰

By relating insurgency to the concept of foreign rule or occupation, questions relating to the individual life and survival strategies of the population arise. Research has shown that the possible action patterns ranging from assimilation to collaboration and opposition as well as the interpretation of these terms is a highly complex and multi-faceted matter; these factors are linked to individual, familial, social, political and cultural loyalty and legitimacy conflicts.⁴¹

So far, only few studies have investigated the living environment of individual actors of insurgency or counterinsurgency. Inspired by the methods applied in Gender Studies, some research has been conducted on the role of women in resistance movements, the gender question and their specific identity formation processes.⁴²

The psychological consequences of insurgency and counterinsurgency actions have been partially investigated in the context of post-traumatic stress disorder studies.⁴³ Studies in the field of cultural history on violence and being subjected to violence are closely linked to this topic. Because insurgency breaks the classic military space pattern consisting in the front, the rear, the occupation zone and the homeland, soldiers of regular troops are deprived of any recovery period. The fear of an attack at any place and at any time results in a heightened stress level. In addition, it is frustrating to fight an invisible and elusive

enemy. Fear, stress and frustration create an urge for “self-assurance” and possibly “revenge”. Excessive violence against alleged or actual insurgents and against the population in support of them might ensue.⁴⁴

In the context of colonial wars, additional violence factors are to be seen in the different climatic and territorial environment of the “peripheral areas”. Tropical diseases, heat, high humidity, unusual diet, linguistic and cultural barriers can also contribute to the frustration and feelings of hatred, which have frequently resulted in spontaneous excesses of violence.⁴⁵

As opposed to spontaneous excesses of violence, the utilization of systematic excessive violence and brutal arbitrariness against the population prevail when military-operative strategies become entangled with culturally defined conceptions of the enemy, as is shown by studies on counterinsurgency on the part of the Wehrmacht during World War II.⁴⁶ If a belief in racial supremacy, ideological conceptions of the enemy and the soldiers’ fears are fostered by the leaders rather than counteracted, an explosion in the use of violence will invariably ensue. In the colonial context, this becomes clearly evident. Therefore, numerous studies deal with the question of the link between the formation of stereotypes, colonial warfare, counterinsurgency, war of extermination and genocide.⁴⁷

The studies on the formation of stereotypes, mentalities, narrativity, performance, identity construction and everyday cultures represent a crucial addition to the research area of military history. Historians who advocate the traditional military history with an applicatory nature might object that military history loses part of its profile and its strict purpose with these studies.

However, the more perspectives and the more methodological paradigms are used for research concerning insurgency and counterinsurgency, the more sophisticated and the more elaborate the body of acquired knowledge will be. Analogous to the actual counterinsurgency doctrine a “comprehensive approach” is required.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Carl Schmitt, *Theorie des Partisanen – Zwischenbemerkungen zum Begriff des Politischen* (Berlin 1963).
- 2 With regard to the apparent contradiction between increased mobility and the telluric nature of partisans, Herfried Münkler, for instance, made reference to Che Guevara, whose revolutionary mobility (between Argentina and Mexico, Cuba and Bolivia) freed him completely from any territorial restrictions, or to the Palestinian air pirates, who became active in 1968 and whose territorial demands for their people were most powerful when the aeroplanes were flying. At the same time, the localization of partisans in terms of territory, as made by Schmitt in 1963, is, according to Münkler, questionable in the age of the “dromocratic revolution” (after Paul Virilio). Herfried Münkler, preface to Herfried Münkler, *Der Partisan: Theorie, Strategie, Gestalt* (Opladen 1990), 10. For more details on the comparison by Carl Schmitt and Paul Virilios concepts of time, see: Joachim Klaus Ronneberger, *Der Partisan im terroristischen Zeitalter: Vom gehegten Kriegeraum zum reinen Krieg: Carl Schmitt und Paul Virilio im Vergleich*, in: Herfried Münkler (Ed.), *Der Partisan: Theorie, Strategie, Gestalt* (Opladen 1990), 81-97.
- 3 Boris Barth, “Partisan” und “Partisanenkrieg” in *Theorie und Geschichte: Zur historischen Dimension der Entstaatlichung von Kriegen*, in: Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift, published by the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, No. 64, issue 1, (Munich 2005), 69-100.
- 4 This led to the successes achieved by partisan operations being declared as successes of conventional warfare. An evaluation of the interplay between all actors in its entirety would be a highly interesting, although difficult task for military historians.
- 5 Gerhard Schulz, *Die Irregulären: Guerilla, Partisanen und die Wandlungen des Krieges seit dem 18. Jahrhundert. Eine Einführung*, in: Gerhard Schulz (Ed.) *Partisanen und Volkskrieg: Zur Revolutionierung des Krieges im 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen 1985), 9-35.
- 6 Eric Hobsbawm, *Bandits* (London 1969). Hobsbawm’s book started a broad scientific debate. His theses were in part adopted and – in a further developed form – used as theoretical foundation for numerous case studies,

- but they were also highly criticised: Richard Slatta (Ed.), *Bandidos: The Varieties of Latin American Banditry*, (Westport 1987). Lewis Taylor, *Bandits and Politics in Peru: Landlord and Peasant Violence in Hualgayoc*, (Cambridge 1986). Paul Vanderwood, *Disorder and Progress – Bandits, Police and Mexican Development*, (Lincoln 1981). Stephen Wilson, *Feuding, Conflict and Banditry in Nineteenth-Century Corsica*, (Cambridge 1988). Paul Hugger, *Sozialrebell und Rechtsbrecher in der Schweiz*, (Zurich 1976). James R. Green, *Grass-Roots Socialism: Radical Movements in the American Southwest 1895-1943*, (London 1978). Donald Crumney (Ed.), *Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa*, (London 1986). Criticism was mainly expressed by: Anton Blok, *The Peasant and the Brigand: Social Banditry Reconsidered*, in: *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 14 (1972), 495-504. J.C. Holt, *Robin Hood*, (London 1982). Linda Lewin, *Oral Tradition and Elite Myth: The Legend of Antônio Silvino in Brazilian Popular Culture*, in: *Journal of Latin American Lore* 5, 2 (1979), 157-202.
- 7 Erik C. Landis, *Bandits and Partisans: The Antonov Movement in the Russian Civil War*, (Pittsburgh 2008).
 - 8 James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven, London 1985).
 - 9 James C. Scott, *Protest and Profanation: Agrarian Revolt and the Little Tradition*, in: *Theory and Society*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1977, 211-246.
 - 10 Herfried Münkler, preface to Herfried Münkler (Ed.), *Der Partisan: Theorie, Strategie, Gestalt* (Opladen, 1990), 7-8.
 - 11 Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, (New York 2008), 18.
 - 12 Ian F.W. Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750*, (New York 2001).
 - 13 Carl von Clausewitz, *Meine Vorlesungen über den kleinen Krieg, gehalten auf der Kriegsschule 1810 und 1811*, in: Carl von Clausewitz, *Schriften, Aufsätze, Studien, Briefe*, published by Werner Hahlweg, (Göttingen 1966).
 - 14 Thomas Edward Lawrence, *The seven pillars of wisdom*, (Oxford 1922).
 - 15 Zedong Mao, *Selected military writings*, (Beijing 1963).
 - 16 Nguyen Giau Vo, *Once again we will win*, (Hanoi 1966).
 - 17 Ernesto Che Guevara, *La Guerra de guerrillas*, (La Habana 1960).
 - 18 Régis Debray, *Révolution dans la Révolution?*, (Paris 1937).
 - 19 Frantz Fanon, *Les damnés de la terre*, (Paris 1961).
 - 20 Carlos Marighella, *Minihandbuch des Stadtguerilleros*, in: *Sozialistische Politik*, published by the Otto-Suhr-Institut, No. 6/7, (Berlin 1970), 143-166.
 - 21 Charles Edward Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (London 1896).
 - 22 Hubert Lyautey, *Du rôle colonial de l’armée* (Paris 1900). Hubert Lyautey, *Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar: 1894-1899* (Paris 1920).
 - 23 David Galula, *Counterinsurgency warfare: theory and practice* (New York 1964). David Galula, *Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958* (Santa Monica 1963).
 - 24 Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences in Malaya and Vietnam*, (London 1966). Robert Thompson, *No exit from Vietnam* (New York 1970). Robert Thompson, *Revolutionary war in world strategy 1945-1969* (New York 1970).
 - 25 Roger Trinquier, *La Guerre moderne* (Paris 1961). Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (New York 1964). Roger Trinquier, *Guerre, subversion, révolution* (Paris 1968).
 - 26 David Kilcullen, *The accidental guerilla: fighting small wars in the midst of a big one* (Oxford 2009).
 - 27 John Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Westport 2002).
 - 28 David Howell Petraeus, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24* (Washington 2006).
 - 29 For a short, but informative overview of the insurgency strategies, the following books are recommended: Werner Hahlweg, *Lehrmeister des kleinen Krieges: Von Clausewitz bis Mao Tse-Tung und Che Guevara* (Darmstadt 1968). Frank Hampel, *Zwischen Guerilla und proletarischer Selbstverteidigung: Clausewitz, Lenin, Mao Zedong, Che Guevara, Körner* (Frankfurt am Main 1989). Peer Schmitt, *Der Guerillero: Die Entstehung des Partisanen in der Sattelzeit der Moderne: Eine atlantische Perspektive 1776-1848*, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 29 (2003), 161-190.
 - 30 Mark R. Costa, *Insurgency/Counterinsurgency: A Selected Bibliography* (Carlisle Barracks 2007): <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/Library/bibs/insurgency2007.pdf>
John Nagl, *Learning Counterinsurgency: An Annotated Bibliography* (Westport 2006): http://psi.praeger.com/doc.aspx?x=x&d=%2fcommentary%2fNagl-20060401-Nagl-20060401.xml&original_url=doc.aspx%3f%3dx%26d%3d%252fcommentary%252fNagl-20060401-Nagl-20060401.xml&ws=WS_PSI&as=doc.aspx&token=202028D1DEDF3916B043312041E44D4F&count=1
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William Rosenau, *Subversion and Insurgency*, RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Paper 2 (Pittsburgh 2007).

- Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies*, NATO Library Thematic Bibliographies No. 7 (Brussels 2007): <http://www.nato.int/structur/library/bibref/them0707.pdf>
 Small Wars Reference Library, *Counterinsurgency and Insurgency*: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/reference/counterinsurgency.php>
 An interesting view of the scientific discussion on the topic of insurgency/counterinsurgency based on a specific, but highly influential institution is provided by: Austin Long, *On "Other War": Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research* (Pittsburgh 2006).
- 31 The following examples represent only an arbitrary selection, but they show the possible scope of culture-related questions: James Russel, *Innovation and War: The US military and the Iraq Insurgency*, in: Barry Rubin (Ed.), *Conflict and Insurgency in the Contemporary Middle East* (Abingdon 2009), 266-282. Stefan Kaufmann, *Network Centric Warfare: Den Krieg netzwerktechnisch denken*, in: Daniel Gethmann, Markus Stauff (Eds.), *Politiken der Medien* (Berlin 2005), 245-264. Stefan Kaufmann, *Die Wissensformierung der "counterinsurgency" im Vietnamkrieg*, in: *traverse*, 2009/3 (Zurich 2009). Friedrich Kittler, *Von Staaten und ihren Terroristen*, in: *Vom Krieg zum Terrorismus?*, Mosse-Lectures, Volume 2002/2003, Berlin, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2003, 33-50. Christina Meyer, *Underground Voices: Insurgent Propaganda in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Peru* (Santa Monica 1991).
 - 32 Bob Clifford, *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media and International Activism* (Cambridge 2005). Bob Clifford, *Marketing Rebellion: Insurgent Groups, International Media and NGO Support*, in: *International Politics* 38, no. 3 (2001), 311-334.
 - 33 Eric Hobsbawm, *Das Zeitalter der Extreme: Weltgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Munich 2007/1994), 211.
 - 34 Carmen Scheide, *Kollektive und individuelle Erinnerungsmuster an den "Grossen Vaterländischen Krieg" (1941-1945)*, in: Heiko Haumann, Brigitte Studer (Ed.), *Stalinistische Subjekte, Individuum und System in der Sowjetunion und der Komintern 1929-1953* (Zurich 2006), 435-453. Aleksandr Gogun, *Stalinskie Kommandos: Ukrainskie partizanskije formirovanija – Maloizucennye stranicy istorii 1941-1944* (Moscow 2008).
 - 35 Harald Potempa, *Die Perzeption des Kleinen Krieges im Spiegel der deutschen Militärpublizistik (1871 bis 1945) am Beispiel des Militär-Wochenblattes* (Potsdam 2008). See also: Peter Lieb, *Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg? Kriegführung und Partisanenbekämpfung in Frankreich 1943/1944* (Munich 2007). Norbert Kunz, *Die Krim unter deutscher Herrschaft (1941-1944) – Germanisierungsutopie und Besatzungsrealität* (Darmstadt 2005).
 - 36 Ian Adam, Helen Tiffin, *Past the last post: theorizing post-colonialism and post-modernism* (Calgary 1990).
 - 37 Jon Abbink, Mirjam de Bruijn, Klaas von Walraven, *Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History* (Leiden 2003). See also: Morten Boas, Kevin Dunn, *African Guerillas: raging against the machine* (London 2007).
 - 38 Herfried Münkler, *Imperien: Die Logik der Weltherrschaft vom alten Rom bis zu den Vereinigten Staaten* (Berlin 2005).
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